

FACT SHEET: UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1769

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1769 by unanimous vote on July 31, 2007. It determined that the situation in Darfur constitutes a threat to peace, and authorized the deployment of a United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID will be the largest United Nations multilateral peacekeeping force ever deployed, with a total presence of more than 31,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel.

UNAMID's Mission

The resolution mandates that UNAMID's initial mission is to:

- Restore security to allow continued humanitarian assistance;
- Protect civilians;
- Monitor ceasefire agreements signed since 2004;
- Help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement;
- Ensure an inclusive political process and support AU-UN efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; and
- Monitor and report on the presence of any illegal weapons in violation of the Darfur arms embargo.

In addition, Resolution 1769 provides long-term missions for UNAMID, including:

- Provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
- Promote human rights and basic freedoms; promote the rule of law by strengthening independent judiciary, prison system and development of legal framework; and
- Monitor the security situation at borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

In addition, UNAMID will have the authority to “take the necessary action” to: (1) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan, and (2) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.

UNAMID's Structure & Deployment

The UN is currently recruiting military personnel and observers, civilian officials, equipment, logistical support, and funding support for deployment of UNAMID. It will consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each. UNAMID troops will be predominantly from African countries, with contributions from other countries if African nations are unable to meet the force requirements within the timeline laid out for deployment.

UNAMID will incorporate the roughly 7,400 current African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel and the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages to AMIS. UNAMID will have a single chain of command, and the UN will provide all command and control structures and backstopping. The UN Security Council appointed Rodolphe Adada as AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Martin Agwai as Force Commander.

While full deployment of UNAMID is not expected until mid-2008, there are three immediate deployment deadlines:

- UN Member States are to finalize their contributions by August 31.
- No later than **October 2007**, UNAMID will establish an operations headquarters and be ready to take command of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and cover the cost of AMIS troops.
- As soon as possible and no later than **December 31, 2007** UNAMID will assume authority from AMIS and will achieve full operational capacity.

The largest UN mission ever, UNAMID is estimated to cost roughly \$2.5 billion a year, plus start-up costs. UN member states will fund the mission through the UN assessment scale. The United States will contribute 27.1%.

Challenges

UNAMID faces a number of challenges as it moves towards deployment and implementation of its mandate. These include:

- Darfur's geographic isolation, harsh climate, limited food and water supplies, and poor infrastructure to support UNAMID's mission. More than 30,000 troops, police, civilians and support personnel will need to be housed, fed, and transported in the Darfur region.
- UNAMID's success is highly dependent on cooperation and compliance by the Sudanese government, which has fought its deployment at every step. Consequences must be developed, enacted, and enforced for Sudanese obstruction of UNAMID's mission.

- UNAMID's success depends on the Sudanese government and rebel forces moving towards a peace agreement and cease-fire. Some key rebel leaders have been unwilling to participate in the unified UN-AU peace process, to the detriment of the Darfuri people.
- UNAMID's peacekeeping mission can support, but will not be a substitute for, the political peace process needed to bring an end to violence in Darfur and enable more than 2 million refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes and communities.

Key Dates and Deadlines

May 5, 2006	Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is signed.
August 31, 2006	UNSC passes Resolution 1706 to expand the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to include deployment in Darfur. China, Qatar and Russia abstain.
November 16, 2006	At High-Level consultations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations presents a three-phased approach to assist the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that would culminate in a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force.
November 30, 2006	AU Peace and Security Council endorses a hybrid force at a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria.
December 19, 2006	Presidential Statement by UNSC endorses hybrid force.
June 5, 2007	Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur (S/2007/307) is released. UNAMID gets its mandate from paragraphs 54 and 55 of this report.
June 12, 2007	Sudan accepts hybrid multilateral force.
July 31, 2007	UNSC passes Resolution 1769 by a unanimous vote to authorize the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).
August 31, 2007	The deadline set within Resolution 1769 for finalization of troop commitments is missed.
October 2007	The deadline set within Resolution 1769 for establishment of an operations headquarters, and for the UN's assumption of command of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and coverage of the cost of AMIS troops.

- October 27, 2007 The proposed date of a new set of peace talks to take place in Libya, under the unified guidance of the UN and AU.
- December 31, 2007 The deadline set within Resolution 1769 for UNAMID full assumption of authority from AMIS and achievement of full operational capacity, while acknowledging that the deployment of forces will continue through the early months of 2008.
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Briefing Paper: What next in Darfur?

September 2007

Background

The situation in Darfur has gone from bad to worse since the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006. For example:

- Murder, rape, bombings, forced displacement, and ethnic cleansing continue to occur throughout Darfur, and across Sudan's borders in Chad and the Central African Republic.
- Despite promises to the contrary, the Sudanese government of President Omar al-Bashir has continued to obstruct international efforts to end the conflict and provide security and protection for the Darfuri people. Sudan's National Congress Party continues to pursue a military solution in Darfur.
- Displacement is on the rise. More than 2 million Darfuris have been dislocated because of the violence, including an estimated 500,000 in the last 15 months, and are living in crowded refugee camps in Darfur and eastern Chad. Humanitarian and relief workers who are providing housing, food, water and medical treatment have been targeted by both government-sponsored militias and rebel groups.
- The two major rebel factions that did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement have fractured into many, smaller groups.
- There are reports that as many as 30,000 non-Sudanese (including citizens from Chad, Niger, and the Central African Republic) have been resettled into Darfur villages by the Sudanese government.

Recent diplomatic efforts

In response to growing activism around the world, the United Nations and many countries have increased their public diplomacy on Darfur. Recent actions include:

- The UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1769 on July 31, which authorizes the unconditional recruitment and deployment of a 26,000 unit hybrid United Nations – African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur.
- There is a growing effort to pursue a single, unified international policy on Darfur, currently being led by the United States and the new leaders of France, President Nicolas Sarkozy, and the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

- UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's trip to Sudan this month has produced an initial agreement to hold new peace talks between the Sudanese government and rebel forces to begin on October 27 and to be jointly led by the UN and AU.
- China, which has considerable diplomatic and economic relations with Sudan, has been more engaged on Darfur diplomacy in recent weeks – although there is still much China must do to bring pressure on the Sudanese government to act responsibly if the goals of peace and protection for Darfur are to be met successfully.
- World leaders have an opportunity to heighten international diplomacy on Darfur during the 62nd session of the UN General Assembly (September to December 2007).

The challenges ahead

The crisis in Darfur remains dire, and requires a multi-dimensional approach. The international community must address four simultaneous challenges in Darfur:

- **Peacekeeping:** The UN must recruit and deploy the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force authorized by Resolution 1769. Several nations have already committed troops, police units, logistics support, civilian personnel, and financing. However, the UN has already missed its initial August 31 deadline for finalization of the recruitment process, and once recruited the force is unlikely to be fully deployed until well into 2008. Conditions are likely to worsen on the ground in Darfur in the interim.
- **Civilian Protection:** The international community must work to improve conditions in Darfur until the UN peacekeeping force is fully deployed and able to undertake its mandate. This means providing increased interim protection for more than 2 million uprooted Darfuris, along with thousands of humanitarian workers and the food and medical supplies needed to support this displaced population. There must be continued pressure on the Sudanese government to stop obstructing relief efforts.
- **Peacemaking:** The UN, AU and their member nations must work with the Sudanese government and with rebel leaders to establish a cease-fire and begin a just and inclusive peace process that will provide an ultimate political framework for peace in Darfur. A workable peace agreement will also help enable the peacekeeping force to successfully carry out its mission. There must be improved coordination among these actors in all stages of the peace process. The international community must work to ensure full participation of rebel leaders in preliminary talks aimed at consolidating a united rebel negotiating position in advance of the eventual UN-AU led talks with the Sudanese government. Anything less than a fully coordinated peace process runs the risk of exacerbating the conflict rather than ending it.
- **Consequences:** The UN, European Union, and individual countries must commit to creating direct, multilateral punitive consequences for any party which undermines the deployment of the peacekeeping force, advancement of peace talks, or which hinders

civilian humanitarian efforts. The U.S. has enacted sanctions on Sudan, but unilateral sanctions alone will likely not be enough to compel Sudan's cooperation. Other countries and multilateral institutions must agree to impose them as well if the Sudanese government, or rebel leaders, obstruct efforts to end the genocide in Darfur.

The UN, AU, and international community must give equal diplomatic priority to both the peacekeeping track – deployment of the UNAMID force – and advancement of a just and inclusive peace process.

Finally, there is a link between peace in Darfur and a successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 by the Sudanese government and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement in southern Sudan. The CPA provides the legal and constitutional framework for political reforms in Sudan, and must be implemented if Sudan, and Darfur, are to have a stable future. Important deadlines in implementing the CPA have been missed, once again demonstrating the Khartoum government's unwillingness to follow through on its commitments. A lasting peace must be pursued for all of Sudan, which necessitates the full implementation of the CPA, and the adoption and implementation of a fair peace agreement in Darfur.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1769

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What is UN Resolution 1769?

A: The UN Security Council determined that the situation in Darfur constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and therefore passed Resolution 1769 authorizing the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Q: What is the purpose of UN Resolution 1769?

A: Through Resolution 1769 and in keeping with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has authorized UNAMID to “take the necessary action” to: (1) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan; and to (2) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers. UNAMID will also monitor and report on any illegal arms present in Darfur in violation of the Darfur arms embargo.

Q: When was UN Resolution 1769 passed?

A: The UN Security Council unanimously passed the resolution on July 31, 2007.

Q: What is the mission of UNAMID?

A: As per both Resolution 1769 and the Report of the Secretary General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of June 5, 2007, UNAMID’s mission is to: restore security to allow continued humanitarian assistance; protect civilians; monitor ceasefire agreements signed since 2004; help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; ensure an inclusive political process and support AU-UN efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes; promote human rights and basic freedoms; promote the rule of law by strengthening independent judiciary, prison system and development of legal framework; monitor security situation at borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

Q: How much will the mission cost?

A: The UNAMID is estimated to cost roughly \$2.5 billion a year, in addition to start-up costs.

Q: Who will fund the mission?

A: UN member states will fund the mission through the UN assessment scale. The United States will pay 27.1% of the cost.

Q: When will the mission deploy?

A: Resolution 1769 requires that UNAMID establish an operation headquarters and be ready to take command of the Light and Heavy Support Packages and cover the costs for AMIS (African Union Mission in Sudan) by October 2007. UNAMID is to achieve full operational capacity as soon as possible, but no later than December 31, 2007, acknowledging that deployment of troops and police will continue into the early months of 2008.

Q: How many troops will there be?

A: The total size of the UNAMID mission is expected to be just over 31,000 troops, police, and personnel. UNAMID will consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including 360 military observers and liaison officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each.

Q: Where will the troops come from?

A: UNAMID troops will be predominantly from Africa, with contributions from other countries if African nations are unable to meet the force requirements. UNAMID will also necessarily contain higher function units, such as communications, air support, and engineers, from non-African nations.

Q: Who has already pledged troops?

A: As of September 17, 2007, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand have pledged infantry troops. Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and Pakistan have pledged police units. Australia, France, China, and Denmark have also offered support personnel.

Q: Does the force need additional troops or equipment?

A: The force has sufficient infantry troop commitments, though it remains to be seen whether all commitments will be fulfilled. UNAMID also still needs helicopters, engineers, and transport personnel and equipment.

Q: When is the UN's deadline for contributions?

A: Resolution 1769 required the UN to finalize contributions for UNAMID by August 31, 2007. That deadline has already been missed.

Q: How is UN Resolution 1769 different from previous UNSC Resolutions on Darfur?

A: UN Resolution 1769 is the first unanimously adopted resolution authorizing a peacekeeping force for Darfur, and thus has greater international support for its implementation. Resolution 1769 was preceded in 2006 by Resolution 1706, which passed the Security Council despite opposition from China, Russia, and Qatar. Due to Sudanese obstruction and a lack of overwhelming international support, Resolution 1706 has the dubious honor of being the first ever UN peacekeeping mission to fail to deploy once authorized by the Security Council. Resolution 1769, on the other hand, was passed unanimously by the Security Council, and has been accepted by Sudan. It nearly quadruples the number of troops currently on the ground, provides protection for aid workers and does not explicitly require Sudan's consent.

Q: What will be the chain of command between AMIS and UNAMID?

A: There will be a single chain of command and UNAMID will incorporate AMIS and the UN Light and Heavy Support Packages. The command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the UN. UNAMID is to take over authority from AMIS before the end of 2007. The UN and AU have jointly appointed Rodolphe Adada as the political head of the mission, and Martin Agwai as the force commander.

Q: What are the next steps for the UN and the African Union?

A: The UN and the AU will act to: transport supplies already in Port Sudan to Darfur; continue to recruit troops, soldiers, police and other key personnel and equipment; hire contractors as necessary to supply food, water, fuel and other logistical support; secure land for barracks; complete deployment of Heavy Support Package and the balance of the UNAMID force; continue a dialogue with donor countries; maintain a dialogue between the AU and the UN on command and control issues. The UN and AU also have the joint lead on facilitating a renewed and inclusive peace process for Darfur.

Q: Who will lead and oversee the UNAMID?

A: The UN Security Council has appointed Rodolphe Adada, former foreign minister of the Republic of Congo, as AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur, and Martin Agwai, of Nigeria, as Force Commander.

Q: What is not included in UN Resolution 1769?

A: Two main provisions – the threat of sanctions against the Khartoum regime in the event of non-compliance, and authorization of UNAMID to seize or collect illegal arms in Darfur in violation of the UN-mandated Darfur arms embargo – were both stripped from the final version of Resolution 1769. The current resolutions states that the UNAMID will monitor existing arms embargos for violations. In addition, the resolution does not condemn the Government of Sudan for its obstruction and harassment of humanitarian workers over the past four years.

Q: What are UN Resolution 1769's weaknesses?

A: The language is somewhat vague on the mandate to protect civilians and on UNAMID's command-and-control structure. It will be necessary to maintain political pressure on all relevant parties to ensure the strongest possible interpretation of these sections of Resolution 1769. There is no mention of the violence which has spread from Darfur into eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. UNAMID has no provisions for halting aerial assaults from Khartoum, and therefore no authority to disable aircraft implicated in attacks on civilians or found to be in violation of any cease-fire agreement. The number of troops may yet prove inadequate, given the sheer size of Darfur, a region as large as Texas.

Q: What are some challenges UN Resolution 1769 and UNAMID may face?

A: Success is contingent upon Sudan's cooperation, and therefore the UN Security Council and the international community must be prepared to enact and enforce punitive consequences upon the Sudanese government for any obstruction of Resolution 1769's implementation. The strength of UNAMID depends on the contributions – of troops, police, equipment, funding, and diplomatic support – of UN member states. In addition, Darfur is a remote and austere region with limited water resources and a harsh climate, and 31,000 personnel will need to be housed, fed, transported, as well as replenished or rotated. Troop contributors are often reluctant to put their soldiers in harm's way, and may try to place qualifications on their troops assigned to UNAMID. Additionally, many of the troops may be contributed without full complements of equipment and provisions.

Even assuming a full deployment of UNAMID, the ultimate goal of bringing lasting peace to Darfur will only be achieved through the will of the Darfuri people, and the Sudanese government, to agree upon a workable political solution. Equal efforts must be made by the UN, AU, and member states to engage constructively in the UN-AU led peace process.

Finally, it is also imperative that the various rebel factions respect a ceasefire, and put the interest of the people they claim to represent above their own political interest in their negotiations with the Sudanese government.

For a copy of UN Security Council Resolution 1769, please click here:

<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/445/52/PDF/N0744552.pdf?OpenElement>